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This chapter draws on Gramsci to theorise the specificities of Irish social movements, 
focusing on migration out of Ireland; the role of “outsiders” to the local community within 
Irish activism; and the recent upsurge in international migration to Ireland. Gramsci offers a 
powerful point of reference, not as decontextualized theorist but the leader of a severely 
repressed party on the brink of clandestinity, deeply concerned with regional and national 
particularity in order to organise more effectively; theorising intellectual activity to explore 
the classed development of social movements; concerned with hegemony not simply to 
understand but also to overthrow; and laying the groundwork for the cross-class alliances of 
the anti-fascist Resistance. 
 
Thinking Social Movement Landscapes  
The question of how to characterise a particular movement landscape should be fundamental, 
but much research on Irish movements sidelines it, whether out of provincialism or the 
assumption that Ireland is fundamentally similar to the core countries where most research 
and theory is produced. Such analyses ignore Ireland’s unusual status as an island where 
peasant struggles succeeded in producing a land reform which transformed rural class 
relationships and land ownership; the Republic’s situation as a west European state founded 
by an anti-colonial movement; or the North’s shaping by four decades of social movement 
conflict. The Republic is one of very few states where popular movements successfully 
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defeated nuclear power, and the impact of women’s, GLBTQ and survivor movements on 
religious power is equally striking globally (Cox 2010a). The ‘Rossport’ struggle against 
Shell’s pipeline stands out for its fifteen-year resistance to one of the world’s largest 
companies, while popular resistance to water charges is the latest in a series of substantial 
challenges to EU politics. 
More formally, the concept of a social movement landscape indicates  
(1) underlying features of how social movements work in a particular context, whether 
city-level (Vester 1993), regional, national or wider (Flesher Fominaya and Cox 
2013); 
(2) that movements cannot fully be understood in isolation, but must be seen within a 
system of characteristic alliances and oppositions – linking different “movement 
families” but also typical alliances between these (solidarity) and with movements 
from above (collusion). In capitalist societies, some degree of the latter is a normal 
part of hegemony, and crisis consists at least in part of movements disrupting such 
alliances; 
(3) that as with Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage structures, which in part reflect 
these and act back on them, movement landscapes are relatively long-lasting, defining 
the “business as usual” context within which movements and their opponents operate; 
only in moments of crisis, when social groups move from passivity to mobilisation, 
detach themselves from previous alliances and form new ones, are these cards 
substantially shuffled; 
(4) that understanding movement landscapes requires attention both to prior movement 
history and to present-day power relationships across the whole society. 
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Existing analyses 
While parallels have been drawn between Irish movements and Mediterranean (Tovey 2007) 
or Latin American movements, the only sustained analysis of the specificities of Irish social 
movements is the Marxist tradition initiated by James Connolly (1910) in terms of “labour 
and nation”, socialism and republicanism, etc. Such analyses of movements in terms of 
ethnicity and empire have long been central to Marxist writing on Ireland. 
This approach explains much about Northern Irish politics and the relationship between 
southern movements and Irish Catholic identity; these dimensions are key to the best analysis 
of the Irish women’s movement (Coulter 1993) as well as Tovey (1993) and R. Allen’s 
(2004) accounts of rural struggles over industrial development – all identifying tensions of 
social class and ethno-cultural identity. Nonetheless, there is much that this approach does 
not tell us.  
Because of the historical matrix of Connolly’s original formulation and the centrality of the 
Northern Irish conflict to state-oriented political thought, far less attention has been given to 
understanding the characteristics of the Republic and southern Catholicism as ‘ethnic’ (rather 
than religious) identity (Cox 2013). Post-colonial writing does enable recognising that society 
in the South is in important ways a once-subaltern social movement which has produced a 
state, a dominant ethnicity, and other key social institutions (a situation common in the 
majority world) - but has far less to say about contemporary movements.  
 
Understanding movement success, defeat and subordination 
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My  “Gramsci in Mayo” (2011) attempted a critique of “labour and nation” accounts from the 
perspective of the losers in the construction of present-day Ireland (subsistence farmers, 
landless labourers, “relatives assisting” and so on), noting the subordination of the labour and 
women’s movement to Catholic nationalism; the breadth of popular mobilisation until the 
1950s in support of the new state and Catholic supremacy, paralleling aspects of the 
continental fascism admired by De Valera and Blueshirts alike; the use of national-
developmentalism to construct hegemonic relationships, paralleling other post-colonial 
contexts; and the extent of collusion with the vast carceral complex and political 
conservatism of ‘Dev’s Ireland’.  
In cleavage terms, the new state was defined by movements representing the pre-
independence ‘periphery’  vis-à-vis those identifying with the one-time ‘core’. Irish 
movement history is not simply post-colonial history: it is also shaped by popular collusion 
with authoritarian cultural nationalism. Connolly’s last-instance loyalty to church and nation 
mirrors this, and offers few resources for breaking with a hegemony grounded in ‘Irish, 
Catholic, nationalist’ identities and deeply embedded in popular culture. 
In terms of (partial and very ambiguous) movement success, we lack serious studies of this 
first process of movement institutionalisation, the frequent post-colonial outcome of 
“movement-become-state” (Cox and Nilsen 2014). A Gramscian analysis would ask how the 
remarkable levels of self-organisation visible in the Land War, the cultural nationalist project 
and the dual-power structures of the War of Independence were channelled, contained and 
ultimately demobilised during the long Irish Revolution (say 1879 - 1924), and how rural and 
urban workers, women and small farmers in the 1910s were split by nationalism and the First 
World War, used as footsoldiers for the nationalist cause and by the mid-1920s put firmly 
back into their various boxes.  
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A key element here would be exploring the “armour of coercion” which protects hegemonic 
relationships (Gramsci 1999: 532). In the Irish context this means   how carceral Catholicism 
and anti-Republicanism policed the boundaries of acceptability. Anti-republicanism, together 
with anti-communism and attacks on atheists etc., worked well for much of the 20th century 
to contain popular movements within a broad framework of loyalty to the established order 
(including self-policing even while protesting; ní Dhorchaigh and Cox 2011); while carceral 
Catholicism traumatised those who broke with ethnic norms and rewarded respectability. 
 
Gramsci in Mayo 
Understanding the national and regional peculiarities of movement organising was central to 
Gramsci’s thought. As a radical organiser during the revolutionary years 1919-20 and party 
leader in a period of European and national defeat and Stalinisation in Russia (Daniele 1999), 
many questions arose. Why did the revolutionary years produce a socialist state in Russia, a 
nationalist one in southern Ireland, the fall of the Kaiserreich - but also so many defeats? 
How should the Italian party respond to rising fascism and repeated insurrectionary failure in 
Germany? How should its leadership argue their national case in the Comintern’s internal 
struggles?  
Regionally, Gramsci (who had started as a Sardinian nationalist, opposed Northern racism 
against Southern migrants and argued for alliances between Northern workers and Southern 
peasants) was interested in the potential for a nationally hegemonic party connecting regional 
and national specificities; the Prison Notebooks pay great attention to specificity. In this 
respect, Gramsci is a more robust thinker than Connolly, who preferred to dismiss these 
differences (and, perhaps, ultimately fell victim to them).
2
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Antonu su gobbu
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I often explain Sardinia to Irish students as the Mayo of Italy. Gramsci’s Sardinia was remote 
and peripheral, a land of poor tenant farmers with a largely alien ruling class (of which his 
father formed part until his imprisonment), from which migrant workers such as his brother 
travelled to the Turin factories, others found work in mining and the occasional bright boy 
like himself could escape on a scholarship. The South bore a similar relationship to the North 
as did Ireland to Britain, and his analysis of Southern politics is directly relevant to theorising 
Irish movements. 
Gramsci constantly attempts to understand the “South and islands”: his analysis of Italian 
unification in terms of the extension of Northern political and economic power, for example. 
His analysis of clientelist power relationships and the ability of “traditional” intellectuals 
such as the village priest, doctor, lawyer etc. to represent local peasant needs bears directly on 
Curtin and Varley’s (1995) analysis of “consensual” community development in rural 
Ireland, where local notables are identified with the “community”4.  
Again unlike Connolly (but both arguing against the mainstream of a core-based, uncritically 
modernist labour movement), Gramsci does not exclude a critique of peasant culture, local 
particularism and cross-class nationalism in his struggle to build alliances between peripheral 
peasants and metropolitan workers. In this analogy, the equivalent to Turin would not be 
Dublin but Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Boston, New York or Chicago. What in 
Gramsci are internal politics would then be mutually critical and supportive international 
solidarity, as his wider European politics were. 
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In the broadest sense, a Gramscian analysis should grasp the peculiarity of Ireland as 
simultaneously ‘conservative province’ - like Bavaria or northeast Italy, a party system 
skewed far to the right and rooted in religious and rural conservatism – but also capable of 
the destruction of an aristocratic land-holding system by popular direct action; the breaking-
apart of the core state of the world’s then-largest empire; or the defeat of nuclear power. It 
would do so by showing how the hegemonic relations constructed in the independence 
process were not simply repressive but involved co-optation through (partially) meeting some 
of the needs expressed by movements.  
 
The Southern Question 
Characteristically, the Lyons Theses (adopted at a Party congress in exile just prior to full-
blown fascist dictatorship) and Some Aspects of the Southern Question, which Gramsci was 
working on up to his arrest, tackle these theoretical and strategic issues through concrete 
proposals and examples (Gramsci 1978)
5
. 
Two of these, in the Southern Question, concern the politics of migrant Sardinian workers in 
Turin. In one case communists scuppered the attempts of emigrant middle classes to lead a 
cultural nationalist association and won poor migrants to a socialist education circle. In the 
other, more dramatically, migrants fraternised so effectively with a Sardinian regiment sent to 
put down a strike that it was withdrawn under cover of darkness. While the first story sets 
class above nation or region, the second recognises how these combine in practical identities: 
the soldiers had understood the workers they came to shoot as ‘gentry’, and it was the 
strikers’ Sardinian origin that led the soldiers to recognise their common situation. 
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Gramsci’s third example highlights the developmental character of his Southern politics. 
Bitterly hostile to Northern racism, which saw Southern peasants and migrant workers as 
simply backward, he argued for building alliances of the poor, by supporting Southern 
peasants’ efforts towards organising independently of from local elites. In the face of rigged 
Southern, the Turin communists offered to elect the radical (but anti-communist)  Gaetano 
Salvemini to their own constituency, with no strings attached, as a peasant representative. 
This is practical solidarity with a peripheral movement whose problems are acknowledged, 
but treated as something to be overcome. 
The Southern Question bears reading in full as Gramsci’s most systematic attempt to theorise 
the relationship between metropolitan and peripheral movements in developing alliances 
geared towards emancipating both. If the Italian Resistance struck deep roots in rural areas 
and cities alike, and if the post-war left built genuine alliances of workers and peasants, this 
was partly due to Gramsci’s earlier efforts to demolish Northern workers’ role as modernist 
allies of Northern capital at the expense of the Southern poor (Magri 2011). 
Thus a Gramscian analysis of Ireland has to analyse ‘Sardinia’ (Mayo, but more broadly the 
then-periphery, today’s Republic) in relation to ‘Turin’ (Birmingham or Boston, but more 
broadly the then-core). Irish activists often note that extraordinarily high levels of migration 
over the past 175 years
6
 have disproportionately exported social discontent – emptying local 
politics of the poorest sections of society, the losers of the construction of a society 
dominated by small property-owners
7
. These were also the groups with the most radical 
traditions of struggle – landless labourers (Dunne 2014), subsistence farmers and urban 
workers. Ireland’s present-day movement landscape can hardly be explained without these 
(literally) absent struggles. It is no accident that one of today’s anti-austerity groups is called 
“We’re Not Leaving”. 
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If one country’s emigrants are another country’s immigrants, we cannot read the politics of 
migrant groups purely in terms of their new situation. We have to ask who people are before 
they migrate: what is their politics and how have they learned to organise? As with 
Sardinians in Turin, the politics of the Irish diaspora have been contradictory. Organising 
skills often enabled ethnic closure geared to monopolising jobs, with attendant racism 
(Ignatiev 1995) and right-wing religious politics. Chicago’s Mayor Daley, or the NYPD, 
inherited the organising traditions of Catholic Emancipation. Conversely, many chose not to 
identify in these terms and rejected racism, religion and / or “Irish” community structures 
(MacVeigh 1996).  
At times this politics was contested in dialectically transformative ways. Irish Catholic 
immigrants in late 19
th
 century London held pitched battles with free-thinking English 
workers over the conflict between the Papal States and Italian nationalism. These conflicts 
were eventually resolved (after the Paris Commune ended French involvement) in joint 
opposition to British imperialism further afield (Cox 2010b).  More broadly, Irish-identifying 
activists played individually radical roles on the left and in the labour movement abroad. 
 
A Processual Theory of Irish Movements  
Central to Gramsci’s historical work is exploring the changing forms of state power. Gramsci 
(1966) offers us some important tools here, albeit often misread. Firstly, his intellectuals are 
organisers as much as theorists, exercising ‘directive’ as well as theoretical activity (Barker 
and Cox 2011). Thus the organic intellectuals with whom he hoped to form the new 
communist party were local trade union activists, peasant leaders and so on. The educational 
task of supporting this development (with Freirean overtones: Mayo 1999) was thus 
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inseparable from organising. The traditional intellectuals of village life are the local priest, 
doctor or lawyer - those formed by previous social formations. 
Intellectuals are organic in that they are formed in the making of a new class (or, as with 
peasants, a class finally becoming a class-for-itself). It is not about people from particular 
backgrounds going to college, but how far the institutions, ideas and practices organisers 
draw on are of the class, of the movement rather than assimilating official ways of behaving. 
Orienting migrant activists towards the official pieties of constitutional politics, or education 
for individual social mobility, does not create organic intellectuals. 
Organic intellectuals, in Gramsci, are equally often the intellectuals of the newly dominant 
class: managers, time-and-motion men - or today consultants, marketers, policy workers and 
so on. The massive formation of a new class who believed in the national-developmentalist 
project, and forged careers in the process, is such a development - as is the subsequent 
construction of the new private-sector service class which has yoked Ireland to multinational 
corporations and international financial institutions.  
Movement, then, is practically expressed by the development of new organising groups - 
from above and below - and their alliances with old (‘traditional’) leadership groups, together 
with the infrastructure of social classes, class fractions or other social groups coming to self-
consciousness, entering into political struggle and ‘making themselves’. This is the problem 
with the ‘betrayal by leaders’ theory (K. Allen 1997) of the Irish working class; while there 
were contending intellectual groups, the consistent victory after 1913 of those who spoke for 
subordination and practiced co-option relied on popular reflexes of respectability, acceptance 
of the national economic project and a strong desire for ‘mainstreaming’ working-class 
institutions (Peillon 1982). The importance of the present is that not for a century has that 
leadership had such a fragile infrastructural base, because of state-driven austerity politics 
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and the breakdown of partnership. However the ‘ethnic’ identification which underpins 
subalternity remains powerful. 
 
Hegemony in Ireland 
 
Much Irish writing reads hegemony in disabling ways that present its success as inevitable 
and exclude effective popular agency, whether colluding with or breaking up hegemonic 
relations. However, a social group only becomes hegemonic to the extent that it succeeds in 
leading other groups, entailing subordinating some of its own corporate (particularist) 
interests and (partially) meeting its allies’ needs. It competes with other fractions within its 
own class, and employs coercion as well as consent: neither among the elite nor the wider 
population does it have or seek universal support. Hegemony is not permanent, but a fragile 
and temporary achievement measured in decades not centuries (Cox and Nilsen 2014). 
Gramsci’s analysis of ‘common sense’ as a terrain of struggle against ‘good sense’ (grounded 
in practical, situated knowledge; Ytterstad 2011) is helpful here, explaining Ireland’s peculiar 
post-independence combination of practical cooperation with local power and sotto voce 
critique - contrasting with the dramatic ruptures of the independence movement.
8
  
Reading the Republic as movement-become-state – land war underpinning independence – 
helps understand its subsequent politics. The postcolonial state claims a popular legitimacy, 
initially from these struggles and subsequently from the national-developmentalist project, 
even once replaced by neoliberalism. Radical movements struggle to be heard while 
significant popular groups accept this practical and intellectual leadership (and when the most 
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visible institutions of popular self-organisation, in labour, farming, women’s or 
environmental movements, are constantly drawn on to renew national elites).   
The process of Irish independence constructed an ethnic identity deeply bound up in the state 
and its characteristic forms of class and gendered power, and embedded in the structures of 
everyday life – family and friendship, the pub and the GAA, the priest and the schoolteacher, 
the policeman and the local politician. This is central to understanding the historical 
conservatism of rural Ireland. It also explains why ‘blow-ins’ (outsiders) have so often played 
a strategic role in movement struggles – and why the autonomous organisation of migrants 
who do not identify, or seek integration within, this conservative sense of ‘Irishness’ holds 
particular political potential.
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The 1960s and 70s saw a clear shift from the hegemonic alliance of ‘Dev’s Ireland’ (national 
capital, large farming, and the church with the subordinate support of small farmers, small 
business, organised labour and women) to the beginnings of neo-liberalism: a shift to an 
IBEC led by multinational interests, with national capital and small business definitely 
subaltern; a long-term ditching of clerical power in favour of a ‘liberal’, modernising alliance 
with the new service class and women; two decades of conflict with labour and working-class 
communities followed by two decades of partnership. Thus even within the newer, 
modernising alliance there are a series of shifts: we are currently living through another one. 
From below, proto-hegemony is a more Gramscian construct than counter-hegemony. A 
broad social alliance, around women’s rights, Carnsore, more recently Rossport or water 
charges, is an aspect of the “war of position”: creating a social coalition which may be able to 
fight a “war of manoeuvre” that actually shifts the main structures of power. Nuclear power 
was defeated and church power was at least partially dislodged. Such alliances - developing 
links between the working-class left, poorer rural interests and culturally radical movements - 
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hold significant potential which may or may not translate further. Among the internal 
opponents of such moves today are elite-oriented organisational leaderships seeking 
professionalization, access to policy-makers, funding, legal and media influence – but also 
cultural conservatives nervous about the effect on ‘people’ of significant challenges to 
everyday ethnic culture. 
 
Our ‘lost revolutions’ 
 
The shift in hegemonic relations started from above, with the Lemass - Whitaker shift to 
foreign direct investment in the late 1950s, followed by the feminist challenge to religious 
and gendered power structures, union struggles and the massive local assertions of urban 
working-class communities in the 1970s and 1980s, along with the ecological confrontation 
with developmentalism at Carnsore and radical political experiments (Hanley and Millar 
2009). These movements broke the localist, religious and mobilising aspects of earlier state 
policy – in interaction with the new hegemony. 
The cultural radicalism of this period was resisted because of fears of fragmenting the 
broader “national-popular” consensus on which the power of the  modernisers ultimately 
rested, but elites were forced to abandon the alliance with the church and offer limited policy 
gains (and, crucially, funding) to the women’s, gay and lesbian, environmental and 
community movements, while ex-activists took up positions of respectability in the liberal 
wings of mainstream political parties, state committees, academia and the media.  
We need an overall analysis of this second wave of movement institutionalisation from the 
1960s to the 1990s: how the slow retreat of church power (but not of Catholic self-
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identification) in the face of the women’s movement, GLBTQ activism and survivor 
organisations worked; how EEC membership led movement elites towards strategies of legal 
and media activism (hence professionalization) rather than popular struggle and alliance-
building; more recent attempts to capture the capitalist high ground (the pink pound, green 
consumerism, fair trade and organic food); social partnership co-opting union leaderships, 
demobilising community struggle into state-driven service delivery and assimilating other 
movements; and the rhetoric of civil society, ‘consultation’ etc. (CAP 2000) in which 
participation became an end in itself. 
Irish social partnership from the later 1980s thus seems less a late outlier from the continental 
pattern of Keynesian neo-corporatism and rather a holding pattern like the limited 
‘democratisations’ of post-dictatorship Latin America: a national agreement not to rock the 
boat and to seek class harmony in the ‘national interest’, in some ways a ‘passive revolution’ 
taming these movements after a series of successful struggles, symbolised by the 1990 
election of Mary Robinson – and the real power-holders’ scramble to adapt. Now, once-
radical ‘outsider movements’ found themselves currying favour with of the same petty-
minded, provincial bureaucrats who had always opposed them, to gain or retain funding - 
entailing a retreat from radical politics. While this period also saw radical movements outside 
this consensus, their mobilising power was constrained by the broader pattern of co-optation.  
Since the mid-2000s, the state’s repudiation of partnership, and subsequent austerity politics, 
are creating another situation. NGO and union leaderships are desperate to retain elements of 
the partnership they depend on. More radical forces find that the state’s attack on partnership 
is widening discontent, but often lack the organisational capacity to make the necessary 
connections. 
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Eppur si muove, and this is the real theoretical problem: theories of movement often stop 
short when movements succeed, are absorbed within the state, become subaltern parts of 
dominant coalitions, etc. - while theories of state and society (still) minimise movements’ 
role, even where the existence of Northern or Southern society and state can hardly be 
understood without movements: which are duly referenced, but not thought about. But the 
reality of movement finds ways to break through.  
In particular, the 1970s and 1980s saw a strong development of international solidarity 
movements, including Cuba, South Africa, Nicaragua, Palestine and Mexico. These involved 
a mixture of returned migrants (often religious, radicalised in liberation theology), political 
refugees, long-distance nationalisms and ‘blow-ins’. International solidarity is deeply 
complex (Aiken et al. 2014; Landy et al. 2014; Trott 2014; Waterman and Cox 2014); in 
Ireland, the bases for solidarity ranged (often within groups: Landy 2014) from a simplistic 
identification between ‘oppressed nations’ via democratic / human rights and Catholic social 
justice orientations to conscious support for popular revolutions. 
The category of ‘blow-ins’ deserves particular attention. Because of intense ethnic closure, 
Irish community structure meant that outsiders, whether from elsewhere in Ireland or from 
other Northern societies (in a still semi-peripheral context) played a disproportionate role in 
most movements, NGOs and community organising. This often remains true today. Reasons 
include biographical availability: particularly in rural contexts, family and friendship 
obligations and social control placed particular constraints on ‘locals’, while ‘blow-ins’, if 
they did not marry in, found themselves constructing groups, events, projects and 
organisations of all kinds to combat isolation and make connections.  
Another explanation is the strong ‘taken-for-granted’ characteristics of Irish social life, in 
which even returned migrants often leave their culturally radical experiences abroad behind 
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them on returning home (ní Laoire 2007). Ireland can be like Tolkien’s Shire: political and 
cultural adventures happen elsewhere, while ‘reality’ means fitting back into an everyday life 
defined by a closed ethnic culture. Hence those who can never fully fit in have a constant 
need to explore alternative possibilities and, as Landy (2015) puts it, import an external 
habitus into the field of struggle; conversely, conservatives seek to delegitimise them as ‘not 
really Irish’. 
 
Gramsci in Turin 
 
‘The Southern Question’ is shaped by Gramsci’s own experience of chain migration to Turin 
and the politics of the Southern diaspora. What can we say, today, about the politics of 
immigrant organising in Ireland? Most immigration has taken place within the last two 
decades, with significant life choices for labour migrants at the start of the crisis (those who 
understand themselves as short-term visitors are less likely to organise). As Scharbrodt et al. 
observe (2015: 2), the obvious parallels are Portugal, Finland or Greece, traditionally 
emigrant countries which have only recently become net immigration countries (in the mid-
1990s for Ireland).  
As this immigration does not follow previous colonial relationships, migrant populations are 
extremely heterogeneous and for most individual ethnicities extremely small. Hence much 
effort goes towards informal support networks, community centres, Saturday language 
schools, religious venues etc., while political orientations for the first generation are shaped 
strongly by those acquired prior to migration and long-distance nationalisms are often 
significant.  
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In this context the older history of solidarity movements revived, as a widespread if 
fragmented process of majority-led groups involved in anti-racism, multiculturalism / migrant 
support and asylum-seeker solidarity / anti-deportation, with roots in grassroots left politics, 
community organising, religious motives and charity (Moran 2011: 120 – 22). However, the 
landscape was also shaped by a largely Irish-dominated NGO sector providing services for 
migrants in line with state and EU funding policies (Cullen 2009), by the context of social 
partnership and the broader clientelist political culture. Migrant activists thus had to decide 
their political orientation early on: whether to tailor their demands to what mainstream 
political allies presented as acceptable and attainable goals in a context of widespread racism, 
or to test the colder waters of self-organising on their own terms, with or without ‘native 
allies’. Similar choices were faced by majority-led migrant solidarity groups (Moran 2011: 
125). 
Autonomous migrant movements, then, have to be seen within a wider movement landscape 
– of movements in Ireland generally and the more immediate landscapes of ‘blow-ins’ in 
Irish organisations, of multicultural and anti-racist NGOs, international solidarity movements, 
grassroots asylum-seeker solidarity groups and migrant community networking and 
institution-building.  
The Migrant Networks Project highlighted “lobbying, advocacy, outreach, information, 
training and support” as features of 436 migrant-led groups (most founded since 2001) which 
“provide essential services, participate in policy debates, implement strategies of cultural 
adaptation and resistance, create opportunities for individual and community advancement, 
and provide a platform […] to become visible” (Lentin 2013: 77). Thus movement activity – 
let alone activity not primarily structured by state funding and seeking access to policy 
makers on consensual terms – is only a small part of migrants’ self-organising.10 As Landy 
(2014b) shows, migrant groups were deeply constrained in the form and content of their 
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2006-8 responses to the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, because they were 
organised in ways dictated by the need for recognition as interlocutors within ‘partnership 
lite’ (Boucher 2008). 
With small absolute numbers and limited second-generation numbers, the even smaller 
numbers engaged politically have an uphill battle to shape political identities that can 
articulate themselves independently. As elsewhere, much of this involves constructing wider 
identities, and organisations such as AkiDwA (originally for African women but now for 
migrant women generally) or the migrant-led Anti-Racism Network indicate one kind of 
identification (Lentin 2012) in sharp contrast to the involvement of African businessmen in 
the clientelistic Fianna Fáil, or the construction of an ‘Italian community’ led by businesses 
with embassy support.  
 
The Empire strikes back 
 
In 2004 the ‘racist referendum’ removed the citizenship rights of children born in Ireland, 
creating a blood-based citizenship and causing entirely foreseen hardship. 79 per cent of the 
(Irish) population voted in favour, with 63 per cent of yes voters understanding their vote in 
anti-immigrant terms. This dog-whistle politics marked the culmination of the process 
whereby the Irish in Ireland ‘became white’, a process also marked by an increasingly pro-
NATO foreign policy and other signals of a ‘European’ identity defined against the majority 
world.  
In this same period, however, autonomous solidarity activism outside ‘social partnership’ 
remained significant, notably Palestinian solidarity and anti-war movements, both connecting 
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members of the majority population and migrants. The February 2003 demonstration against 
the Iraq war was as large as any Irish protest ever. Meanwhile, direct action against US 
military use of Shannon airport, while small, included a wide range of Irish-born and migrant 
activists. Other solidarity activism is less visible: for example, support for Asian movements 
among Buddhist groups in Ireland, bringing together immigrant and majority members (Cox 
2013, ch. 7).  
Of particular interest is the solidarity between Irish Traveller organisations and Roma / Sinti 
movements in Europe, with the small Traveller groups seeking legitimacy, allies and skills 
from their European allies and extending solidarity to Roma / Sinti in Ireland. One key 
organisation, Pavee Point, became a ‘Traveller and Roma Centre’; in July 2007 they offered 
solidarity to over 80 Roma left to fend for themselves on a motorway roundabout. This highly 
public support earned them an instant threat to their funding, underlining the political costs of 
activism and the difficulty of combining funded service provision with radical politics.  
In this period, migrant-led organising autonomous from the state has grown, not least in 
response to these constraints. Key struggles have challenged ‘direct provision’ (the 
segregation of asylum seekers in isolated accommodation with minimal autonomy) and 
deportation, both striking at the hard core of state racism. Significant groups include the 
previously-mentioned Anti Racism Network; the migrant-led Anti Deportation Ireland, in 
alliance with direct provision residents (Lentin 2013: 81); and the more recent Movement of 
Asylum Seekers in Ireland (Flood 2014).  
Ethnically and culturally outsider activists have consistently played a disproportionate role 
within Irish movements, and this seems set to continue. If Connolly could distribute election 
leaflets in Yiddish in 1902, the Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign has consistently played 
a significant role on the Irish left; Irish and Polish anarchists collaborated in the mid-2000s to 
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produce Polish-language material; while in 2015 the radical wing of the Spanish diaspora 
joined Irish movements in organising a Grassroots Strategy Weekend. More generally, non-
local activists (from elsewhere in the Republic, Northern Ireland, other Northern countries or 
the global South) continue to play a key role in most radical social movements.  
 
Gramsci in West Dublin? 
 
Since the mid-2000s, the combination of the radical alliance politics of the anti-capitalist 
movement (Cox 2006) and the crisis of partnership has provoked many simulations of 
movement coalitions. Practically, these have consisted of events aimed at elites (geared to 
publicity, lobbying or funding) and driven by organisational leaderships committed to 
restoring partnership – often tied to the pro-austerity Labour Party and in at least one case 
with material support from the employers’ organisation IBEC. Initially such events saw 
tables packed with bureaucrats horrified at the thought of street protests; more recently, the 
same basic practice has been rebranded with anti-austerity rhetoric, invocations of revolution, 
mentions of Latin America etc. Since the response from elites depends on the answer to the 
question “you and whose army?”, it becomes important to manipulate wider movements into 
believing that more serious social change is sought.   
However, dramatic movements are now taking place outside such events, as massive popular 
resistance to water meter installation across working-class Dublin, rooted in local 
communities, places the state in crisis (Cox and Nilsen 2015, MacCionnaith 2015). In 2011, I 
raised the possibility of “an Irish M-15, Icelandic or Tahrir Square experience of mass 
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popular mobilisation against failed elites”, noting that “Labour and Fine Gael would have to 
lose all credibility in the way Icelandic politicians and Mubarak did”. I argued that:  
 
“[S]omething more is needed: certainly the radical-democratic experience of mass 
mobilisation, but also the generalisation of struggle from public space to the 
compartmentalised worlds of workplace and school, family and church - and a serious 
settling of accounts with past responsibilities for collusion in corrupt politics and abusive 
institutions. This may seem impossible, but Ireland is a funny place in terms of social 
movements. The fear of seeming strange or different means that often movements have to 
trundle along as minority affairs for years - until apparently all at once those who don’t want 
to stand out jump the same way (and then often deny that they ever felt any differently)” 
(Cox 2011).  
 
The second large-scale water charges protest, on 1 November 2014, tackled this problem by 
organising over 100 local protests – enabling people to see that they would not be ridiculed 
for participating or isolated in refusing to pay, and making visible the potential for direct 
resistance to meter installation. From that point, despair has increasingly turned into hope. 
 
Beyond the grip of “Irishness”? 
 
In activist and conservative discourse alike, Ireland’s movement landscape is often 
understood (justifiably) as restricting radical politics and (less plausibly) as an eternal feature 
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of national character. However, landscapes are not outside history – or, at times, earthquakes. 
As in the Andes, direct confrontation with specific nexuses of power at Rossport proved 
hugely generative. It positioned an almost archetypally ‘Irish’ community against the 
destruction of farming, fishing and tourism: when individuals, families or communities are 
existentially threatened they can abandon what turns out to have been (long-term) conditional 
loyalty to ‘ethnic’ ways of doing politics. So too, on a much wider scale, with direct action 
against water charges, regularly described as ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’.  
Secondly, as with the complex alliances around Rossport, the water charges movement 
involves a very broad social alliance – as any proto-hegemonic struggle must. By definition, 
this reshaping of routine alliances creates difficulties (cf. Ó Donnabháin 2014 on ethnic 
tensions within the Rossport Solidarity Camp), but contra the Irish addiction to harmony, 
nuclear power could be defeated with three competing campaigns (Dalby 1984). At time of 
writing, sectarian and sectoral differences are mostly being contained in the water movement, 
the relationship between the working-class Dublin core and wider participation is holding, 
and particularism is far weaker than usual. 
Third, the attempt to put ‘Rossport’ outside the pale of the ethnic community, through anti-
republicanism and state violence, was only partially successful, and for many provoked 
greater distancing from ‘Irish’ media and police. With the water struggle, the same 
combination of media hysteria and state thuggery has been experienced far more widely, and 
the actual violence filmed on phones and shared on social media is readily contrasted to 
establishment horror at ‘fascist’ atrocities such as … blocking the deputy prime minister’s car 
or insulting the president.  
All of this, finally, is happening where the state’s attack on partnership, intransigent austerity 
politics and preference for coercive approaches has undermined ‘Irish consensualism’. 
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Organisational leaderships tied to funding, lobbying and respectability are less and less able 
to transmit any of these. Change within movements, and within organisations, is part and 
parcel of what is being fought over. 
In the broadest perspective, the hope of challenging the ‘little Ireland’ that exports its poor 
and radicals, and grounds internal complacency in loyalty to taken-for-granted culture, must 
involve new forms of solidarity across differences of place and ethnicity. If allegiance to 
class and gender power relations is structured through an unreflected identity bound up with 
everyday structures of national and religious affiliation, rising migrant involvement in 
movements generally might offer a point of fracture for this last-instance loyalty to ethnic 
culture.  
It may provide some of the energy needed to restore the possibility of alliance between the 
politically-radical but culturally-conservative Irish left, and movements which challenge the 
socio-cultural bases of oppression and exploitation but avoid direct confrontation with the 
state (Epstein 1993; Thompson 1976; Rowbotham and Weeks 1977). The loss of state 
funding for SMOs (Lentin 2013: 82) may support more radical trends within migrant 
activism. As Landy (2013: 73) puts it, “there is nothing inevitable about the current 
channelling of migrant groups into being service providers” and they have the potential to 
0move outside a restrictive ‘migrant field’ and challenge power relations within the wider 
society. As with Gramsci’s Sardinian workers in Turin, this is not just about “migrant” 
movements but equally about the emancipation of “majority” movements from Irishness, 
remaking the movement landscape. 
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1
 This chapter draws on my “Gramsci in Mayo” (2011). I am grateful to the Finnish NGO 
publisher, Into, for permission to reuse some of this material, now exploring the “outside” of 
the ethnic “inside” explored there. Thanks are due to David Landy and the editors for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
2
 For biographies of Gramsci see Fiori (1990) and Davidson (1977); for an overview of 
interpretations see Liguori (1996); for some scholarly approaches see Baratta and Liguori 
(1999) or Burgio and Santucci (1999). 
3
 Nairn’s (1982) title underlines the importance of reading Gramsci as Sardinian. 
4
 Another analogy lies in how the rural middle classes colonised the national administrative 
apparatus. 
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5
 This discussion concentrates on his analysis of the events, rather than on historical 
reconstruction. 
6
 For example, in 1891 a full 39 per cent of those born in Ireland were living elsewhere. 
7
 Ireland is a European exception in that women migrants equalled or outnumbered men – 
understandably considering the sexual politics involved (Hall and Malcolm 2008). 
8
 This is often explained by fear - but the scale of practical repression in Ireland has been far 
less than in most west European countries; the real fear has been of stepping outside 
clientelist relationships and the narrow bounds of tolerance, ceasing to be part of the 
“community” as conservatively defined; Cox 2014. 
9
 One of the main responses from church and state is the attempt, prominent in both state 
multiculturalism and “interfaith” work, to construct an “immigrant community”, a “Buddhist 
community” (Cox 2013), an “African community” etc. which would adapt itself to a parallel 
form of this. 
10
 I share Landy’s (2013: 67) scepticism of overly-broad celebrations of all migrant activity 
as by definition resistance even when attempting to integrate on mainstream terms. 
